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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the implications of the
General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) on the design of an IoT
healthcare system. On 25th May 2018, the GDPR has become
mandatory within the European Union and hence also for all
suppliers of IT products. Infringements on the regulation are
now fined with penalties of up 20 Million EUR or 4% of the
annual turnover of a company whichever is higher. This is a
clear motivation for system designers to guarantee compliance
to the GDPR. We propose a data labeling model to support
access control for privacy-critical patient data together with the
Fusion/UML process to design GDPR compliant system. We
illustrate this design process on the case study of IoT based
monitoring of Alzheimer’s patients that we work on in the
CHIST-ERA project SUCCESS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infringements on the basic principles of data processing,
rights of data subjects, or other non-compliances to Articles
of the GDPR are fined with up to 20 million EUR or 4% of the
annual turnover of an undertaking whichever is higher (Article
79 (3a) [1]). Therefore, it is a crucial need for any company
to find ways to achieve and keep GDPR compliance.
The General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) [1] is a 209
page legal document. For small businesses, it might be hard
to tackle such a complex requirements specification. For these
reasons, we attempt in this paper, to show practically how to
overcome the difficulty of such a legal formulation by
(a) summarizing the legal text, highlighting the technically
relevant parts and
(b) providing a fairly generic application example taken from
the IoT healthcare context establishing a data protection
model for private data and
(c) using the Fusion/UML analysis and design process we
produce a global architecture supporting the requirements
given by the GDPR.
We use established techniques from security and software
engineering to show how the GDPR can be systematically
mapped onto a formal system architecture specification. Tech-
nically, we propose a combination of information flow control
models for data protection in distributed systems by labeling
data with security labels in the style of the Decentralized
Label Model (DLM) [2] and employing the development
Fusion/UML for analysis and design of software systems.
More precisely, we use an extended process [3] that establishes
a consistency relationship between analysis and design and
produces a formal specification for the implementation.
The contribution of this paper is to
• break down the legal document of the GDPR into more
digestible technical requirements,
• show how the Decentralized Labelling Model (DLM) can
be integrated with the pragmatic software engineering
methods Fusion/UML to produce a formally specified
system architecture,
• illustrate the process on the SUCCESS IoT healthcare
application.
We first give a brief overview of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) pointing out which parts are relevant
for technical design of information systems (Section II). We
then provide an overview of the background: after a short
introduction to the extended Fusion/UML-translation process,
we give an in depth summary and analysis of related work
(Section III). In Section A, we introduce the application case
study of our CHIST-ERA project SUCCESS [4] on security
and privacy of IoT. We then show how parts of the GDPR data
protection specification can be mapped to the Decentralized
Data Label model (DLM). Next, we analyse the requirements
of the SUCCESS case study providing a system class model
and operation schemas. A further design of object interactions
finishes the system architecture. The Fusion/UML-ObjectZ
translation process [3] allows schematic translation into a
formal specification (Section V). We conclude in Section VI.
II. THE EUROPEAN STANDARD GDPR
The GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) is in full
called “the regulation of the European parliament and the
council on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data”. For this paper, we use the final proposal [1] as
our source to provide a comprehensive summary of the main
points relevant for a technical analysis. Despite the relatively
large size of the document of 209 pages, the relevant portion
for this is only about 30 pages (Pages 81–111, Chapters I
to Chapter III, Section 3). Chapter I generally defines the
scope of the regulation in terms of main purpose (protection
of individuals), material scope (personal data) and territories
(in the Union). Chapter II defines the principles for data
processing and retention.
While Chapters I and II provide essential definitions, more
technical requirements for data processing are provided in
Chapter III, Sections 1 to 3.
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• Section 1 describes Transparency and Modalities. Article
12 states that the controller must provide any information
and communication (specified in Article 14–20) “relating
to the data subject in a concise transparent and intelligible
and easily accessible form . . . ”.
• Section 2 provides details of the access rights and the
information that the controller must provide to a data
subject on request (Articles 14, 14a, 15), like the retention
time and the purpose of data collection.
• Section 3 defines the right of a data subject to rectification
and erasure of personal data (“right to be forgotten”) as
well as the right to restrict its processing (Articles 15–18).
In summary, Chapter III specifies that the controller must
give the data subject read access (1) to any information,
communications, and “meta-data” of the data, e.g., retention
time and purpose. In addition, the system must enable deletion
of data (2) and restriction of processing.
An invariant condition for data processing resulting from
these Articles is that the system functions must preserve any
of the access rights of personal data (3).
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Extended Fusion/UML Software Development Method
The method Fusion/UML is a software development process
comprising analysis and design phases. It defines consistency
rules enabling the control of consistency in the various models
and in between them throughout the development process.
The final result of the Fusion/UML process is an accurate
description of the class interfaces suitable for any object ori-
ented programming language. The analysis phase is concerned
with the question: what is and does the system. One major
result of this first step of Fusion/UML is a so-called operation
model describing in schematic form the system operations.
The second part, the design, is concerned with the question:
how does the system achieve its goals. One major model
of the design is the so-called object interaction model. It
uses UML collaborations to define the system operations by
message flows of method invocations between objects in the
system. Analysis and design contain various other models, but
the two parts operation model and object interaction model
contain most of the information about the operational part of
the system design. The paper [3] extends the Fusion/UML
by a systematic translation of the operation model and the
object interaction model into the formal specification language
Object-Z [DR00], [S00]. Object-Z is suitable as it constitutes
an extension of Z by the concepts of classes and objects and
has a well established reference semantics [SKS02].
In the context of Security and Privacy for the IoT for the
SUCCESS project, this method is applied to systematically
derive a formal specification for the software system managing
the secure data handling between the distributed entities. The
challenge lies in the security part which poses special require-
ments as put up by the GDPR but also more generally due to
the difficult nature of security as a non-functional requirement.
However, for the same reasons security needs to be designed
into the system from the beginning. If cannot be “plugged
onto” a system at later stages – an additional motivation
to use a well-established software engineering method like
Fusion/UML.
B. Related Work on Privacy in IoT Healthcare systems
A mobile application solution for healthcare called the
Electro Cardiogram Android App (ECG App) [5] allows
the end user to view data logging functionalities and ECG
waves in the background. The application allows logged data
to be uploaded to either a specific medical cloud, or the
user’s private centralized cloud, here the healthcare and patient
monitored records are kept and can also be retrieved and
viewed for analysis by medical personnel. The Design of
the entire system of the proposed solution in this paper is
based on a layered architectural design pattern that divides
the system into 3 different units called layers; the hardware
layer which contains the IOIO microcontroller and sensors to
collect signal data; the application layer which receives signal
data sent from the hardware layer, and also contains 3 sub
layers; and the Cloud layer which has the FTP server present
in it, and receives the file from the FTP Client. The Server is
also responsible for storing file in the File Table Technology.
The ECG Mobile app makes use of an IOIO microcontroller
board, that obtains signal from a person using ECG electrodes
and sends to the mobile device wirelessly using Bluetooth
technology. The monitored ECG waves of a patient displayed
in the mobile app is stored in Binary format which will be
encrypted and uploaded to an SQL server private database
in a secure manner making use of the FTPES protocol. This
System though tested however is only limited to monitoring
ECG waves, but with proposed design improvements to be
applied to other medical applications.
In order to better protect and preserve sensitive patient
health information, the paper [6] proposes a holistic privacy
middleware which they called ECMP middleware, that exe-
cutes a two-stage concealment process within a distributed
data protection protocol that utilizes the hierarchical nature of
IOHT devices. This proposed solution complies with the Orga-
nization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
privacy principles. The OECD privacy principles are a set of
fair information practice that can be considered as the primary
components that enables the protection and privacy of personal
data for cloud based services. The principles covers; Collection
limitation, Data quality, Purpose specification, Use limitation,
Security safeguard, Openness, Individual participation, and
Accountability. The ECMP is the main architectural element
of the framework because it is responsible for the execution
of the topological formation protocol for data collection. The
ECMP middleware is deployed in 3 usage layers; the data
collection layer which consists of the various IOHT devices
and the mobile application that is used to capture the vital
signs from the user’s body or home , and also collects related
data external. This data is used to make recommendations
and treatment; the intermediate layer that consists of 2 fog-
nodes, where each of the nodes host the holistic privacy
middleware that will execute the second stage of the two-stage
concealment; the final layer is the service layer that consists
of the various healthcare web services that are hosted on the
cloud platforms. It also facilitates the collaboration between
various service providers.
The paper [7] introduces a smart gateway that safeguards
the entire healthcare system using a modified Host Identity
Protocol Diet Exchange (HIP-DEX) key exchange protocol
and a new key exchange scheme based on Low Energy
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) routing protocol.
For the purpose of this research demonstration, the health
monitoring of sports personnel was selected. The research
security approach is based on a lightweight mutual verification
and key exchange protocol which is based on a hash function
with no restriction on data storage, operation speed, size of
data input etc. Using a lightweight modified HIP-DEX key
exchange scheme, a secure link can be created between the
cloud and the end-user device. The entire architecture of
the proposed system is based on a secure gateway which is
implemented using Arduino MKRzero microcontroller board.
After the parameters of the sports person has been collected
using heartbeat/pulse, muscle and blood pressure sensors, the
sensors collect the data and communicate using a pre-shared
key that can be specified during the device configuration
time. The gateway then analyses the received data for any
abnormalities in it using an adaptive rule engine. In the case
that abnormalities are discovered, the monitoring device will
be notified using a fast and secure channel enabled using a
new key exchange scheme based on the LEACH protocol.
The channel between the gateway and the cloud is modified
using the HIP-DEX protocol. End users such as the doctors,
nurses and other authorized personnel can frequently view
and monitor the health statistics using an android mobile
application.
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLE FROM IOT HEALTHCARE
A. System Model
The example of an IoT healthcare systems is from the
CHIST-ERA project SUCCESS [4] on monitoring Alzheimer’s
patients. Figure 1 illustrates the system architecture where data
collected by sensors in the home or via a smart phone helps
monitoring bio markers of the patient. The data collection
is in a cloud based server to enable hospitals (or scientific
institutions) to access the data which is controlled via the smart
phone.
Before embarking on an in depth security analysis and
design, we observe a few issues related to the context and
main stream technologies which we have to put up with:
• Sensors and sensor hub hardware run proprietary operat-
ing systems and are thus outside of the control we have
over such systems. A plethora of attacks can easily be
found and more be imagined.
• The Privacy sensitivity of the sensored data is difficult to
measure. For example, the fact that the patient walks into
a room, as observed by a motion sensor, is not critical.
cloud
hospital
home 
Patient
sensor hub
sphone
Doctor
Fig. 1. IoT healthcare monitoring system for SUCCESS project
However, if the behavioural algorithm that accumulates
motion data into the data “patient is wandering” – which
is an indicator for early Alzheimer’s symptoms, the data
becomes privacy critical.
Therefore, we exclude the home from the security perimeter.
We stipulate this as a necessary security assumption. This is
the best we can do. Consequently, data cannot be held in the
server in the home but needs to be uploaded immediately to
the cloud server. Similarly, sensor data transmitted via the
smartphone is not kept on the phone.
Within the security perimeter, we thus place only the cloud
server and the connected hospital (or other client institutions).
The smartphone and the home server feature as data upload
devices and the smartphone additionally as a control device
that is included in some of the use cases.
We cut short the full Fusion/UML process and present
just its outcome corresponding to the analysis process based
on these observations. This first outcome, the Fusion/UML
analysis model, defines the system class model as depicted in
Figure 2.
Another result of the Fusion/UML analysis along with this
system architecture is a set of operations schemas based on the
system class model and additional use cases. We present them
together with the system design using object collaborations in
the following section.
V. A GLOBAL GDPR COMPLIANT IOT ARCHITECTURE
The Decentralised Label Model (DLM) [2] introduced the
idea to label data by owners and readers. We pick up this idea
but extend labels with additional information, like purpose and
retention time, to cover all requirements of the GDPR data
protection requirements.
In this section, we first introduce the necessary details
about DLM and concepts for extending this model for our
purposes. Then we present the use cases for our IoT healthcare
application as a suite of system operations defined by operation
schemata and designed into object interactions. Using the
system class model from the previous section, we can apply
the extended Fusion/UML process [3] and derive a formal
system specification.
home ∗ 1
sphone
PIN
∗
1
system border security perimeter
Auth
patients
reg usrs
1 Has ∗
DB
table
1
1
Controls
hospital
staff
table
Fig. 2. System class model for IoT healthcare system
A. Security and Privacy by Labeling Data
We firstly need to specify the owner and the set of readers
given by the following type dlm.
type dlm = actor × actor set
Labelled data is then just given by the type dlm × data
where data can be any data type. Additional meta-data, like
retention time and purpose, can be encoded as part of this
type data. We omit these detail here for conciseness of
the exposition. We may use the concept of erasure [8] to
implement the latter.
Using labeled data, we can now express the essence of
Article 4 Paragraph (1): ’personal data’ means any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (’data
subject’).
B. Use Cases
The Fusion/UML analysis actually produces the system
class model with the system border only after the use case
model has been specified. However, we take the liberty to
present them only now since we needed to introduce DLM
first and can now better motivate the decision of putting the
extended system border as a security perimeter to include the
hospital server.
There are four use cases for the IoT healthcare application:
1) User data is uploaded to cloud from home server or via
mobile phone.
2) User wants to delete or change data using his mobile
phone as control device.
3) Others (hospital, researchers, GPs) access data in the
cloud.
4) System needs to maintain distributed consistency and
therefore
a) ensure that only label preserving operations are
allowed;
b) data is tracked within the system;
c) time (and erasure) is monitored and enforced on
all data in the system.
In the previous section, we already defined the system
border as a security perimeter that encompasses not only the
access controlled cloud data base but also the hospital server
into one system. Consequently, the security labels must be
maintained consistently by the hospital and thus within the
healthcare system1. This design decision is now justified by
Use Case 4.
C. Operation Schemata
Although in their particular incarnation novel to the UML,
operation schemata are just a composition of UML tagged val-
ues. The values tagged together are: Operation, Description,
Inputs, Reads, Changes, Sends, Pre-condition, and Post-
condition. That is, an operation schema contains the opera-
tion’s name, its informal description, and inputs. Furthermore,
such a schema defines the objects and associations from which
the operation reads and on which it writes, further specifying
concrete conditions on those objects using a with-clause
followed by a formal condition. The pre- and postconditions
tagged with an operation schema may define formal conditions
about the operation.
The operation schema for the upload operation defines the
system function that is required by Use Case 1: a data item
d and its intended DLM-label (o,r) are input by an actor who
further provides an id as its identity. Provided that this id is the
same as the inputting actor’s identity o, the database is updated
and a message about the successful completion is sent to the
initiator. The uploading party could be the smartphone or the
home server expressed by the set of classes {home,sphone}.
Operation = upload
Description = The home server or mobile phone uploads
patient data to the cloud server.
Input = d: data, (o,r): dlm, id: actor
Reads = as: Auth with o ∈ as.patients ∧ r ⊆
as.reg usrs, Controls
Changes = db: DB with (as,db) ∈ Controls
Sends = :{home,sphone}:{upload ok}
Pre = id = o
Post = db.table’ = db.table ∪ {((o,r),d)} ∧
is sent{trans ok}
The operation schema for delete is very similar in its
structure to upload but it can only be initiated from the smart
phone which servers as the control unit for the user. If the
data item with the right dlm label as input by the user exists,
it is deleted from the database and hospital servers.
1Remember, we excluded the home server from the system as a necessary
security assumption in the previous section.
Operation = delete
Description = The mobile phone deletes patient data on the
cloud server and hospital.
Input = d: data, (o,r): dlm, id: actor
Reads = as: Auth with o ∈ as.patients ∧ r ⊆
as.reg usrs, Controls
Changes = db: DB with (as,db) ∈ Controls
h: Hospital with (as,h) ∈ Has
Sends = :{sphone}:{delete ok}
Pre = id = o ∧ ((o,r),d) ∈ db.table ∧
((o,r),d) ∈ h.table
Post = db.table’ = db.table \ {((o,r),d)} ∧
h.table’ = h.table \ {((o,r),d)} ∧
is sent{delete ok}
The operation schema for download is, contrary to the
previous two operations, initiated from the hospital side: on
input of an id (of a staff member of the hospital), a data
item d is copied over to the hospital’s data table if the DLM
label permits this, that is, the hospital h is named in the
reader labels r. Besides the message “download ok” a second
message “access” is sent to the user’s smart phone to inform
of the data access.
Operation = download
Description = A doctor downloads patient data from the
cloud server to the hospital server.
Input = o, id: actor
Reads = as: Auth with o ∈ as.patients ∧ r ⊆
as.reg usrs, db: DB with (as,db) ∈ Controls
Changes = h: Hospital with (as,h) ∈ Has
Sends = :{sphone}:{access},
:{doctor}: {download ok}
Pre = ((o,r),d) ∈ db.table ∧ id ∈ h.staff ∧ h ∈ r ∧
o ∈ as.patients ∧ h ∈ as.reg usrs
Post = h.table’ = h.table ∪ {((o,r),d)} ∧
is sent{download ok} ∧ is sent{access}
D. Design: Object Collaborations
The system design is the phase of the software development
process that follows the analysis, and needs to be consistent
with it. This implies that for all system operations defined
in the analysis, the object interaction model has to define
object interaction graphs describing the execution of the
system operation on the objects in the system. To that end,
the object interaction graphs introduce new operations: the
graphs are UML collaborations. They define message flows
in a sequential order using numbers. The object interaction
starts from an actor executing the system operation as a
message to an object called the controller of that system
operation. The controller delegates the initial system operation
to so-called collaborators, objects of the system that are
associated to the controller. The initial task set out by the
controller can be delegated in turn by the collaborators to other
associated objects. All objects that are corresponding with each
other must be connected by associations in the system class
model. This is a consistency conditions. Others are given by
the selection, pre- and postconditions defined in the system
operations. UML annotation with { } may be employed to
define the selection of this particular object or annotating
pre- or postcondition for the method calls contained in the
messages tagging it to the objects.
The operation for upload leads to the object collaboration
illustrated in Figure 3. The preconditions already identified
in the system operation must hold, that is, the initiator’s id
must match the owner label o, must be a registered patient,
and the reader label set r must only contain registered readers.
Since we now look at actual objects and not classes (like in
the analysis), we can additionally identify an actual object x of
either class home or sphone as the initiating object and further
require that this object corresponds to the actor o and id,
respectively. This specifies authentication and must be imple-
mented by some authentication protocol in an implementation.
In the internal step 1, the system operation upload delegates
the data upload to the collaborator object db of class DB and
tags the postcondition representing the change of the data base
as a UML annotation tagged to db.
The operation for delete leads to the object collaboration
illustrated in Figure 4. Provided the conditions similar to
the previous case and consistent with the operation schema
hold, the system operation delete is simultaneously delegated
to corresponding methods in data base objects and hospital
objects. In the collaboration diagram, the class set {DB,
Hospital} generalises over the two branches one for the data
base and one for hospitals. This simplifies the diagram but is
just a graphical abbreviation.
The operation for download leads to the object collaboration
illustrated in Figure 5. The collaboration graph nicely shows
the two sides hospital and smart phone involved by having
two actors included. Conditions are again directed mainly to
ascertain authenticity and label correctness, and then a two-
level delegation leads to the cloud database. For conciseness,
we only define the two get-method calls. Clearly – and this is
specified in the UML-tag condition h.table’ = h.table ∪ {((o,r),
d)} – the calls to get lead to the retrieved labelled data d to be
copied inversely up to hospital. However, following the spirit
of Fusion/UML, we omit that level of implementation detail
in the specification.
The object collaborations nearly finalize the Fusion/UML
process. The developed models of analysis and design can
then be schematically transformed into a set of interface spec-
ifications. In the extended Fusion/UML process, a schematic
translation process produces a complete Object-Z specifica-
tion. We omit this output here for reasons of space but it is
attached as an appendix.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have summarised the new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and illustrated on an IoT
healthcare patient monitoring system, how to design a system
architecture specifying the privacy access control using the
decentralized label model (DLM) and employing the extended
Fusion/UML method as software development process.
We have in detail discussed related work for IoT healthcare
systems in Section III. Although some of these works address
data protection, none does specifically address GDPR.
The results of applying the Fusion/UML method to Security
and Privacy of IoT are generally interesting. Firstly, a security
 @
h
x : {home, sphone}
upload(id, ((o, r), d))
-
as : Auth
{x = id = o ∧
o ∈ as.patients ∧
r ⊆ as.reg usrs}
1 : add(((o, r), d))
-
db : DB
{db.table′ = db.table ∪ {((o, r), d)}}
2: send to{upload ok}
ff
Fig. 3. Object collaboration diagram for the upload.
 @
h
x : sphone
delete(id, ((o, r), d))
-
as : Auth
{x = id = o ∧
o ∈ as.patients ∧
r ⊆ as.reg usrs}
1 : delete(((o, r), d))
-
y : {DB, Hospital}
{((o, r), d) ∈ y.table ∧
y.table′ = y.table \ {((o, r), d)}}
2: send to{delete ok}
ff
Fig. 4. Object collaboration for delete operation.
 @
h
x : sphone
3: send to{access}
ff
as : Auth
{x = o ∧
o ∈ as.patients ∧ h ∈ as.reg usrs}
1 : get(h, o)
ff
db : DB
{((o, r), d) ∈ db.table ∧ h ∈ r}
2 : get(h, o)
-
h : Hospital
{(as, h) ∈ Has ∧ dr ∈ staff ∧ dr = id
h.table′ = h.table ∪ {((o, r), d)}}
4: send to{download ok}
-
 @
h
dr : doctor
download(id, o)
ff
Fig. 5. Object collaboration for the download operation.
argument at the early requirements stage shows that security
protection in the home is for the application of a home based
IoT patient monitoring system futile. Therefore, we restricted
our attention to the cloud and hospital server part of the
system. For the development of a system design specification,
the Fusion/UML method appeared to be working well.
There are two main observations of some importance. In the
application, we have realized that we needed to consider the
system distributed over the cloud and hospital server as one
system to enforce consistent labeling. This security we simply
emulated by abusing the system class border as a “security
perimeter” pretending it to be one system. This could be more
explicitly addressed as a feature in Fusion/UML and also in
implementations (for example, using a distributed ledger, a
blockchain, to enforce consistent labeling across distributed
servers). Secondly, there is the recurring issue of authentica-
tion. In the application, we have augmented that by explicitly
stating identity of real and communicated actor identities, for
example, id = o. This could also be more explicitly addressed
by using a dedicated notation like auth(id,o). It would be a
valuable continuation of this initial experiment, to extract these
two major observations and refine the (extended) Fusion/UML
method to accommodate them to provide a Security enhanced
Fusion/UML.
Object-Z as a target language could be replaced by other
formal modeling frameworks potentially better suited for se-
curity analysis. In a dedicated tool for security protocols, like
ProVerif, it might be impossible to embed all of the abstract
notions of object-oriented systems. Another possibility would
be to use a more expressive framework, for example, the
Isabelle Insider framework [9].
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Fig. 6. Translation of the system model for the IoT healthcare system of the analysis phase
APPENDIX
This appendix contains the output of the translation process
to Object-Z. The translation follows a schematic procedure [3]
and thus is created practically automatically. The translation
of the system model of the analysis is shown in Figure 6,
the design model derived mainly derived from the object
interactions is shown for the classes Auth and DB in Figure
7 and for Hospital in Figure 8.
Fig. 7. Translation of the design model for the IoT healthcare system parts Auth and DB
Fig. 8. Translation of the design model for the IoT healthcare system for class Hospital
